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Abstract
Ogburn et al. (2019) discuss “The Blessings of Multiple Causes” (Wang and Blei,
2018). Many of their remarks are interesting. However, they also claim that the paper
has “foundational errors” and that its “premise is...incorrect.” These claims are not
substantiated. There are no foundational errors; the premise is correct.
Wang and Blei (2018) provide assumptions, theory, and algorithms for multiple causal
inference. The deconfounder method involves modeling the causes, using the model to
infer a substitute confounder, and then using the substitute confounder in a downstream
causal inference. The deconfounder is not a black-box solution to causal inference. Rather,
it’s a way to use careful domain-specific modeling in the service of causal inference.
In Ogburn et al. (2019), Ogburn, Shpitser, and Tchetgen Tchetgen (OSTT) provide a tech-
nical meditation on some of the theoretical aspects of Wang and Blei (2018). Many of
their remarks are interesting, and we are glad to participate in such a vigorous intellectual
discussion. Other commentary includes Imai and Jiang (2019) andD’Amour (2019a).
In their discussion, OSTT claim that there are “foundational errors” with the paper and that
“the premise of the deconfounder is...incorrect.” These claims are not substantiated. There
are no foundational errors; the premise is correct.1
The identification results in Theorems 6–8 capitalize on two requirements: (1) the distribu-
tion of the causes p(a) can be described by a factor model and (2) the factor model pinpoints
the substitute confounder Z , i.e. Z
a.s.
= fθ(A) for some fθ . The first requirement relies on
the successful execution of the deconfounder, i.e., finding a factor model that captures p(a).
The conditional independence structure of factor models guarantees that the substitute con-
founder Z pick up all multi-cause confounders and no multi-cause mediators or colliders.
The second requirement is the “consistency of the substitute confounder.” It is satisfied
when the number of causes goes to infinity and Z remains finite-dimensional. From Lemma
4, it guarantees that Z cannot pick up single-cause mediators or colliders.
1All references refer to Wang and Blei (2018), version 3 as of Apr 15, 2019. This reply was revised in
response to version 3 of Ogburn et al. (2019), which was revised in response to the earlier version of our reply.
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Single-cause variables, colliders, and Lemma 4
OSTT’s main concern revolves around Lemma 4, which states the substitute confounder
cannot pick up information about multi-cause mediators, single-cause mediators (OSTT
Figures 1a and 1b), or single-cause colliders (OSTT Figure 1c). Further consequences of
Lemma 4 are that the substitute cannot pick up single-cause M-bias (OSTT Figure 1d).
Lemma 4 is correct, as is the proof in the paper.
OSTT invoke a series of arguments, but none is valid. (a) The identification theorems in
the paper all require a pinpointed substitute confounder (Definition 4). In OSTT Figure 1a,
R cannot be pinpointed. When causes are causally dependent, there may not be a valid
substitute confounder (see Section 2.6.6). (b) Z ⊥ Y |A does not imply “no confounding.”
Any Z that is a deterministic function of A will satisfy this statement. Consider the
second equation in Theorem 6; it satisfies the independence statement in question, and
there is confounding. (c) In Figures 1b and 1c, OSTT worry about single-cause mediators
and colliders. The substitute confounder is constructed to render the causes conditionally
independent. It cannot be both single-cause and consistent, which precludes it from picking
up single-cause mediators and colliders. (See the discussion of Lemma 4 below.) (d)
OSTT Figure 1d concerns single-cause M-bias. They worry that substitute confounder
picks up multi-cause confounders and single-cause M-colliders, but misses single-cause
confounders. For the same reason as in (c), the substitute confounder cannot pick up
single-cause M-colliders.
Points (c) and (d) rest on the correctness of Lemma 4. Lemma 4 and its consequences says
the following. Suppose the distribution of causes can be represented by a factor model and
the substitute confounder can be pinpointed. Then the substitute cannot contain informa-
tion about post-treatment variables, whether single-cause or multi-cause, or single-cause
variables, including single-cause confounders and single-cause colliders. This fact might
seem surprising. Here we expand on its statement and provide an alternative proof.
Restatement of Lemma 4. No single-cause pre-treatment variable, single-cause post-
treatment variable, or multi-cause post-treatment variable can be measurable with respect
to a consistent substitute confounder.
Proof. First, the substitute cannot pick up any multi-cause post-treatment variables. Other-
wise, the substitute can not render all the causes conditionally independent.
The substitute also cannot pick up any single-cause variables. These variables include
pre-treatment variables, such as single-cause confounders, and single-cause post-treatment
variables, such as single-cause mediators or colliders.
The key idea behind the proof is the following. We assume the causes pinpoint the substitute
confounder Z
a.s.
= fθ(A), as is the case where there are many causes. The deconfounder
further requires that the converse is not true, i.e., that the substitute does not pinpoint the
causes. This fact holds in a probabilistic model of the causes, such as when the dimension
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of the substitute stays fixed as the number of causes increases. Further, the deconfounder
requires that the factor model can not have one component of the substitute a priori be
a deterministic function of another component; this fact also holds in probabilistic factor
models. The proof then follows by contradiction: if the substitute picks up single-cause
variables then the factor model must be “degenerate,” i.e., non-probabilistic.
Here are the details. Suppose the substitute Z does pick up a single-cause variable. Then
separate Z into a single-cause component and a multi-cause one, Z = (Zs, Zm). Without
loss of generality, assume the single-cause component only depends on the first cause. The
assumption of a consistent substitute confounder says
p(z | a, θ) = p(zs, zm | a, θ) = δ( fs(a ; θ), fm(a ; θ)), (1)
where a = (a1, . . . , am) are the m causes and fs(·), fm(·) are the deterministic functions that
map causes to substitute confounders.
Now calculate the conditional distribution of the single-cause component given the causes,
p(zs | a)
= p(zs | a, zm = fm(a ; θ))) (2)
= p(zs | a1, zm = fm(a ; θ))) (3)
=
p(zs | zm = fm(a ; θ)) · p(a1 | zs, zm = fm(a ; θ))
p(a1 | zm = fm(a ; θ))
. (4)
Equation 2 is due to the consistency of substitute confounder. Equation 3 is due to Zs ⊥
A2, . . . , Am | A1, Zm. Equation 4 is due to the definition of conditional probability.
Equation 4 and Equation 1 imply that at least one of p(zs | zm = fm(a ; θ)) and p(a1 | zs, zm =
fm(a ; θ)) is a point mass. But this is a contradiction: either term being a point mass implies
that the factor model is degenerate. The former is a point mass when one component Zs
of the substitute is a deterministic function of another component Zm. The latter is a point
mass when the first cause is a deterministic function of the latent Z .
Note the same argument would not reach a contradiction for multi-cause variables Zm. The
reason is that
p(zm | a)
= p(zm | a, zs = fs(a ; θ))) (5)
=
p(a1, zm | zs = fs(a ; θ))) ·
∏m
j=2 p(a j | zm)
p(a)
, (6)
where
∏m
j=2 p(a j | zm) can converge to a point mass with non-degenerate factor models and
m → ∞. 
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Other remarks of OSTT
OSTT question the random variable on which we used the Kallenberg construction in
Lemmas 1 and 2. Definition 3 is the Kallenberg construction we intended, and it involves
potential outcomes; see Eq. 39 in the paper.
OSTT further argue that potential outcomes cannot only be included in only one of Eq.
38 and Eq. 39. This claim is not true. Eq. 38 and Eq. 39 jointly define the Kallenberg
construction: Eq. 39 describes a requirement that the random variables Ui j’s in Eq. 38
must satisfy in the Kallenberg construction.
OSTT claim a counterexample where a random variable separates a multi-cause confounder
into single-cause confounders. However, a consistent substitute cannot separate a multi-
cause confounder into single-cause confounders. Returning now to Lemmas 1 and 2, it
is these lemmas that link factor models of the causes to their Kallenberg construction and
unconfoundedness, thanks to the consistency of the substitute confounder.
OSTTdiscuss a “missing assumption” inTheorem6 that f1 is less smooth than f2. This fact is
sufficient for the theorem, but it is not necessary. Identification requires the differentiability
of f1, f2 and the non-differentiability of f (Assumption 1 of Theorem 6).
OSTT further provide a counterexample where the f1 is equal to f2( f (·)). Under the
assumptions of Theorem 6, this cannot be true. Theorem 6 requires that f be piecewise
constant and f1, f2 be continuously differentiable; thus the function f2( f (·)) can only be
piecewise constant or constant. When f2( f (·)) is piecewise constant, it is non-differentiable
and hence cannot be equal to the continuously differentiable f1. When f2( f (·)) is a constant
function, there is no confounding; Theorem 6 (Eq. 41) is correct.
OSTT claim that the paper leaves open that Theorem 7 is “vacuous” because the overlap
condition may be impossible to satisfy. D’Amour’s discussion of the paper (D’Amour,
2019a) shows how Theorem 7 can be useful.
OSTT remark that requiring a pinpointed substitute implies that the unobserved multi-cause
confounding is effectively observed. Their intuition is correct—themultiplicity of the causes
and the consistent estimability of factor models enable us to effectively observe such multi-
cause confounding. It is these two features that form the basis of the deconfounder.
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Discussion
In their discussion, OSTT remind us that all causal inference requires assumptions, and
we agree. Causal inference with the deconfounder involves a number of assumptions and
trade-offs. Among them are the following. (1) There can be no unobserved single-cause
confounders. (2) When we apply the deconfounder, we trade an increase in variance for a
reduction in confounding bias; there is no free lunch. (3) We do not recommend using the
deconfounder with causally dependent causes, such as a time series.
There are many directions for research. We need a more complete picture of identification;
D’Amour (2019a,b) and Imai and Jiang (2019) make good progress. We need to understand
the finite-sample properties of the deconfounder (or, howmuch is lunch?). We need rigorous
methods of model criticism for assessing the validity of the substitute confounder. But these
are directions for research; the foundations of Wang and Blei (2018) are intact.
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